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"DEREGULATION"-HAS IT FINALLY ARRIVED?
THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
DOROTHY DIANE SANDELL
T HE YEAR 1978 was an exciting one for the airline industry.
It celebrated the seventy-fifth anniversary of the first powered
flight by the Wright brothers and saw the beginning of a period of
feverish competition which has drastically changed the industry's
way of doing business. The Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter
referred to as "CAB" or "the Board") encouraged low fares to
increase competition. Congress finally passed a deregulation bill
which was signed in October of 1978.1 These developments have
helped the consumer in the form of bargain fares. What they will
mean to the airline industry in the long run remains to be seen.
In the next few years the eyes of many analysts and observers
will be on the airline industry to see how it reacts to deregulation.
As airline deregulation is the first effort to relax governmental con-
trol in a highly regulated industry, its success or failure could
alternatively encourage or discourage future efforts to lessen federal
regulation in other areas. The purpose of this comment is to survey
the previous regulatory scheme and the way in which the new de-
regulation bill proposes to make reforms of that system, the possible
impact of this reform on administrative law in general and on the
aviation industry in particular.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Prior to 1938, just as in the past few years, the economic regu-
lation of domestic air transportation was a matter of continuous
discussion and consideration in Congress.' When the Army was
I Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302, 1305-1308, 1324, 1341, 1371-1373,
1374, 1376, 1378-1382, 1386, 1389, 1461, 1471, 1473, 1482, 1490-1504).
2 CAVES, Am TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 123 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as CAVES]. One source of discussion was the Postmaster General's cancellation
in 1934 of all existing contracts with airlines to carry mail. He took this action
because of charges that the contracts had been awarded in 1930 as the result of
collusion between the Post Office and the major air carriers. These charges were
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carrying the mail for a short time and met with unsatisfactory
results,' the Air Mail Act of 1934" was developed and passed.
The Air Mail Act of 1934 delegated the power to control the
air transport industry to three governmental agencies.8 The Post
Office was to award contracts for carrying air mail and to determine
the routes and schedules.6 This resulted, as a practical matter, in
complete entry control, since a subsidized air mail contract was
essential to a successful airline operation." The Interstate Com-
merce Commission fixed rates of mail pay.8 Finally, the Bureau
of Air Commerce was placed in charge of safety and technical
regulation.!
Difficulties with the organizational structure described above
soon became apparent.'" Jurisdiction of the three agencies over-
lapped." By 1935, the Federal Aviation Commission, created by
the Air Mail Act of 1934 to make policy recommendations, advo-
cated a complete revision that would centralize authority in one
new commission.'" Competition among governmental departments
concerning who would get the revised regulatory powers delayed
matters for several years.'" Finally, a comprehensive statute gov-
erning regulation of civil aviation was passed-the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938." That statute was revised and the controlling
law is now the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act)."
investigated by a special Senate committee and during this period the Army was
assigned to carry the mail. Id. at 123-124.
Twelve Army pilots were killed due to poor equipment and a lack of plan-
ning. Comment, An Examination of Traditional Arguments on Regulation of
Domestic Air Transport, 42 J. AiR L. & COM. 187, 189 (1976).
"Ch. 100, 48 Stat. 508 (1934).
8 CAvEs, supra note 2, at 123-124.
I1d. at 124.
'See id.
8Id. A statutory minimum was set and the Commission was to review rates




12 Id. at 125.
1 Id.
14Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (current version at U.S.C. § 1301-1542
(1976)).
"5Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542
(1976)).
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For thirty years the provisions for economic regulation were
not changed, although the administrative structure was altered
over the years.1" Since the 1940 administrative reorganization, the
five-person Civil Aeronautics Board has had the responsibility of
administering the economic regulation of the airlines." The Board
is guided by a declaration of policy in the exercise of its powers
and duties. The following policies, among others, are to be con-
sidered in the public interest and in accordance with public con-
venience and necessity:
[1] The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the United
States Postal Service, and of the national defense;
[2] The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the high-
est degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and
coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
[3] The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimina-
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
[4] Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the United States Postal Service, and of the national defense;
[5] The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
[6] The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.18
These guidelines have been criticized as being both vague' and
inconsistent." Criticism stems from the fact that the Board is
expected to both promote and regulate air transportation. 1 It has
been pointed out that achievement of some of the expressed goals,
such as that of sound economic conditions, may directly conflict
16 CAVEs, supra note 2, at 125.
1749 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976).
1849 U.S.C. S 1302 (1976).
"See CAVEs, supra note 2, at 126-27; Dupre, A Thinking Person's Guide to
Entry/Exit Deregulation in the Airline Industry, 9 TnNsP. L.J. 273, 303 (1977).
10 See CAVES, supra note 2, at 126-27.
1 See id.
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with other goals, such as the prevention of unjust price discrimi-
nation. ' The objectives have been characterized as virtually im-
possible to achieve due to their internal inconsistencies and at the
same time as so vague that the Board can find justification for
almost any action they take in the declaration of policy."
Other sections of the Act deal with controls over exit and entry,
fares, and routes?' The Board's authority over entry into the air-
line industry is rooted in its power to issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity which is required before an air carrier
may engage in any air transportation. ' The policy standards dis-
cussed above are used in deciding whether or not the certificate
is required by public convenience and necessity." In addition, the
applicant must be fit, willing and able to perform the transporta-
tion."' Any abandonment or suspension of service also requires
prior Board approval."
The Act requires every air carrier subject to Board regulation
to file its tariff schedule with the CAB, to keep it open for public
inspection and to observe it so long as it is in effect.2 Tariffs can
only be changed on thirty days' notice unless the Board permits a
more rapid change."
Route control is exercised by placing restrictive conditions on
the certificates issued by the Board.3 ' Certificates specify the points
between which the transportation is authorized and the type of
service to be rendered. '
This brief description of the statutory background reveals exten-
sive government intervention into the airline industry. Virtually
every aspect of the business, including prices, entry and exit from
the market, and routes to be served, are government-controlled.
22 ld.
I ld. at 127.
2 2See 49 U.S.C. 551301-1302, 1305-1308, 1324, 1341, 1371-1373, 1374, 1376,
1378-1382, 1386, 1389, 1461, 1471, 1473, 1482, 1490, 1504 (1976).
21See 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976).
201d., § 1371(d).
27 Id.
8 1d., 5 1371(e).
249 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976).
20Id.
3149 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(1) (1976).
32 Id.
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The wisdom of such a scheme is the subject of the following
section.
II. REGULATION UNDER THE CAB
The enabling statute gave the CAB considerable flexibility in
regulating the air transportation industry.' Accordingly, it has
been free to develop its own policies over the years which have
been the source of many debates and controversies.
By virtue of a "grandfather clause" in the 1938 Act, all of the
then existing trunk carriers ' received certificates of public con-
venience and necessity automatically.' The CAB has not issued
another such certificate in the past forty years.' This inaction has
been supported by the Board's reasoning that its duty is to protect
existing carriers."' This does not mean, however, that no new car-
riers have been allowed to enter the marketplace. Local service
carriers, which provide service connecting smaller communities
to larger cities have increased in number. 8 The original trunk
carriers, however, account for a great majority of the air travel in
this country.' The policy of protecting the "grandfather" carriers
from new entries onto the trunkline routes has been severely criti-
cized in recent years as evidencing a pro-industry bias incom-
patible with the duty of regulation."0
'See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
'"These are the major airlines which engage in the "long-haul" interstate
transportation of passengers. They include: American Airlines, United Air Lines,
TWA, Eastern Air Lines, Braniff Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines,
National Airlines, Northwest Orient Airlines, and Western Air Lines. Kelleher,
Deregulation and the Practicing Attorney, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 261, 271 n.29
and accompanying text (1978).
"CAvES, supra note 2, at 169.
'Kennedy, The American Airlines and the Necessity of Deregulation, 9
AKRON L. REv. 631, 631-32 (1976).
11 CAvES, supra note 2, at 170.
8W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 16 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as JORDAN].
" In 1970 the trunklines had 12,288.7 million revenue ton-miles as compared
with 1,591 million revenue ton-miles cumulative for other classes of carriers.
G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT:
THEORY & PRACTICE 111 (1974).
' See Kennedy, Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 41 J. AIR
L. & COM. 607, 608 (1975); and Pillai, Government Regulation in the Private
Interest, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 29, 30 (1974).
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The CAB's regulation of air fares also has met with criticism."'
It has been argued that without regulation fares would be lower.'
Others have pointed out that fares in the United States are only
twenty per cent higher than in 1948. '
The proponents of price regulation have argued that, like the
public utilities, the air transportation industry is a natural monop-
oly." That is, due to the high costs of entering the market and the
uniformity of the product, without regulation one company will
inevitably take over the market.' The argument is that a single
company can provide the product or service at a cheaper rate due
to the high fixed costs of investment, which the company would
eventually absorb. As the company grows larger, the cost of growth
gets lower." Opponents of regulation argue that the natural mo-
nopoly scenario simply does not fit the airlines. The product is not
uniform in view of competing schedules and services, and marginal
costs do not decrease as the airlines grow larger."
Another of the major concerns about allowing price competi-
tion is a reduction in airline safety. The theory is that airlines will
cut corners to compete by taking short cuts on safety." "Cutthroat"
competition also has been predicted to lead to widespread bank-
ruptcy of smaller airlines and even greater concentration by large
carriers. This idea has been discounted, however, by pointing to
the successful experiences of intrastate operations which have
liberal pricing policies.'
Route control by the CAB, like other forms of regulation, has
its friends and its foes. Some airline officials predict that excess
capacity and higher fares will result from relaxed regulations on
41 E.g., Kennedy, supra note 40, at 619-23; Miller, A Perspective on Airline
Regulatory Reform, 41 J. Am L. & CoM. 679, 684-85 (1975); Passell & Ross,
The C.A.B. Pilots the Planes, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug 12, 1973, at 9.
"Miller, supra note 41, at 689; JORDAN, supra note 38, ch. 11.
'Heymsfeld, An Introduction to Regulatory Reform for Air Transportation,
41 J. AIR L. & COM. 665, 671 (1975).
"Comment, supra note 3, at 194.
4Id. at 195.
4Id.
' JORDAN, supra note 38, at 194; Dupre, supra note 19, at 294-95; Koontz,
Economic and Managerial Factors Underlying Subsidy Needs of Domestic
Trunk Line Air Carriers, 18 J. Am L. & COM. 127, 134 (1951).
41 Miller, supra note 41, at 693.
'Kelleher, supra note 34, at 284-85.
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what routes the airlines can travel." The argument is that there will
be a rush to enter the profitable markets, resulting in excess ca-
pacity. Then, to compensate for the loss of money on these routes,
airlines will have to charge higher fares on the less competitive
routes." This argument ties in with another concern of the pro-
ponents of regulation. Their contention is that regulation by the
CAB has resulted in a complex network of routes in which there
is a considerable amount of cross-subsidization." This refers to
the fact that less profitable routes to smaller cities are subsidized
by profitable routes to larger, more densely populated areas. Due
to this practice, passengers traveling to the small cities and towns
need not pay extremely high fares." Opponents of regulation point
to what they see as the inequities of forcing travelers on popular
routes to help pay for the tickets of those on less profitable runs.'
Even those who oppose deregulation of routes admit that the CAB's
performance in the area of route regulation has been extremely
poor. This evaluation primarily refers to the incredibly long periods
of time taken by the agency in making route decisions.'
This brief presentation of the differing views on regulation under
the CAB provides the background for an evaluation of recent
moves toward deregulation by both the CAB and the Congress.
"57 CONG. DIG. 180 (1978), quoting Albert V. Casey, President of American
Airlines; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 9, 1977, at 75, quoting Frank Bor-
man, President of Eastern Air Lines.
" See Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regulation of Air Transport,
41 J. AIR L. & COM. 793, 806-7 (1975).
5Id.
5Id.
"Notes and Comments, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transporta-
tion and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416, 1428 (1965). It has
been postulated by opponents of regulation that commuter airlines will probably
step in if major carriers were allowed to drop some of these routes. U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, May 9, 1977, at 75-76, quoting Senator Howard W. Cannon.
55 Kennedy, supra note 40, at 615. At the beginning of 1975, two-thirds of
the applications on file with the CAB had been pending over two years. One-
fourth had been pending over five years. There was even a moratorium on route
applications in the early seventies in which no new routes were granted for about
five years. Id. Eastern Air Lines President Frank Borman has stated: "Now, CAB
has a grave tendency to simply not consider things. . . . For over eight years,
we've been trying to fly from Atlanta to Cincinnati, Cleveland and Detroit,
CAB has not yet given us a decision." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note
54, at 76.
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III. CAB's EFFORTS TO DEREGULATE
The CAB took the first step in liberalizing its regulatory policies
in late 1975 when it authorized "OTC's" (One Stop Inclusive
Charter Tours)." This ended the requirement that travelers on
charter flights be members of a club or group in order to get
cheaper rates. The package price still had to include the hotel bill,
however."' In late 1976 the Board authorized "ABC's" (Advance
Booking Charters)."s This eliminated the requirement that the price
include the hotel bill. The only prerequisite was that the traveler
make a confirmed reservation thirty to forty-five days before the
flight." These initial steps toward deregulation by the CAB coin-
cided with the introduction into Congress of various deregulation
bills. Certainly the existence of pending legislation provided an
impetus for the CAB to begin preparing the industry for the in-
evitable prospect of statutory revision.
In early 1977 the major airlines began to respond to the in-
creased competition which resulted from the Board's rule changes
concerning charters. A price war officially began in February 1977
when American Air Lines advertised for the first time its "Super
Saver" fares." At that time these fares represented from thirty-five
to forty-five percent savings on the New York to California route.
Other airlines soon entered the battle. As of August 1978, some
airlines offered as many as ninety fares and discount packages.
The Big Four-United, American, T.W.A. and Eastern-all off-
ered "Super Saver" fares which cut thirty to fifty percent off regu-
lar economy fares. Other such offers were Braniff's "Small Pota-
toes," Texas International's "Peanuts" and Continental's "Chicken-
feed" fares. 1
In June of 1977, Alfred E. Kahn became Chairman of the
CAB." Although his immediate predecessor, John Robson, had
initiated the relaxation of route restrictions,"3 his efforts were
-e 14 C.F.R. S 378 (1978).
57 Id.
5' 14 C.F.R. 5 371 (1978).
59 Id.
"0 WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
01 TIME, Aug. 14, 1978, at 51-52.
62 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 758 (May 23, 1977).
"Northwest Airlines was given the Chicago to New Orleans route, CAB
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minimal in comparison to the vigorous actions taken by Chairman
Kahn in his first months in office. Although Mr. Kahn left the
CAB in late 1978 to become Chairman of President Carter's anti-
inflation program, his efforts at the CAB will not soon be forgotten.
The Chairman was never slow to tell the public and the airlines
what he hoped to do: "So what I am trying to do, to put it in the
broadest possible terms, is to remove the meddling, protective and
obstructionist hand of government, and to restore this industry,
insofar as the law permits, to the rule of the market."'
Kahn outlined his program for liberalizing CAB regulation. The
program involved: greater receptivity to applications for new oper-
ating authority, particularly to those accompanied by low-fare
options; willingness to make route awards temporary, with renewal
dependent on performance; permission to existing carriers to re-
align routes and eliminate restrictions that limit their operating
flexibility; grants of authority to enter markets that may not be
able to support more carriers, then grants to others to enter if
the first carrier does not; a more permissive attitude toward market
exit where entry has been liberalized.' The program also included
a relaxation of the functional and operational restrictions on the
various categories of carriers and on the services they offer. An
example of this was the liberalization of charter rules mentioned
above." The Board also has relaxed limitations on the right of
scheduled carriers to run charters apart from their certificated
routes. In addition, it has declared a willingness to allow carriers
to transfer customers from charters onto empty seats of scheduled
flights.'
The Board also contemplated a full-scale revision of the stand-
ards set forth in the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation ' (here-
inafter cited as DPFI). The revision includes abandonment of the
following aspects of the DPFI: its criticism or disapproval of dis-
count fares except on a temporary basis; its required cross-
Order No. 77-2-58 (Feb. 11, 1977); Delta, Braniff, and Continental were given
route authority from Denver to various points in Florida, CAB Order No. 77-4-
146 (Apr. 28, 1977).
"Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 6, 1978, at 37.
id.
Id. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
67 Id.
"8 CAB Order No. 70-1-147 (Jan. 29, 1970).
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subsidization of short-haul by long-haul traffic; its imposition of
uniform rates per mile in all markets; its prescription of minimum
mark-up of first class over coach fares and a maximum discount
of economy from coach; its requirement of uniform rates based
on industry cost, regardless of individual carriers, methods of opera-
tions and cost; its insistence that rates be judged by coverage of
cost, without regard to direction of travel or popularity of route."
The Board did not hesitate in putting these plans into action.
In August 1978 airlines were permitted to cut fares during peak
periods by as much as fifty percent without Board approval."0 In
off-peak periods they were allowed to reduce fares by seventy per-
cent and sell first class tickets at a price they thought traffic would
bear.'
Many of these proposals have been criticized by airline officials.7"
They claimed that the Board was backing away from the current
law and may have been acting illegally."' In the area of fares, for ex-
ample, the Board has been criticized for dismissing illegal rebating
charges against China Airlines in June 1978.' The dismissal is said
to evidence CAB's encouragement of a break from published tariffs,
which are specifically required by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958."' Kahn said: "The law prohibits departure from tariffs, but
departures from tariffs are good for competition. Rebating as we
see it is a consequence of non-competitive rate levels, and the best
theoretical remedy is to reduce fares.""
The effects of fare and route competition upon airline earnings
have been phenomenal. Certificated carriers had an overall deficit
in 1975 of $84 million, had a net income of $564 million in 1976,
and profits climbed to $708 million in 1977." These profits are of
course welcomed by the airlines, but airline officials also point to
69Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 6, 1978, at 37.
- 14 C.F.R. § 399 (1978).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Bus. WEEK, July 24, 1978, at 127.
"' Id. In response to critics who say he is tearing down the present system be-
fore another is ready, Kahn said: "That's our dilemma." Id.
74 Id.
-"49 U.S.C. S 1373 (1976).
"' Bus. WEEK, July 24, 1978, at 128.
77 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Am CARuIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS, Vols.
XXIV-4 and XXV-4.
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the uncertainty of the future caused by the CAB's actions and
Congressional deregulation. The airlines are concerned about the
need to replace their old jets and fear that the uncertainty caused
by deregulation will scare away investors. 8 Airlines also feel that
these price cuts simply cannot go on forever without impairing
profits," and perhaps even safety standards."
The opponents of deregulation theorize that in the long run
prices will have to rise due to higher costs. No regulatory change
will lower certain costs, such as fuel bills. Furthermore, the pro-
posed freedom of entry to be granted by the CAB will cause fuel
costs to increase because airlines will offer more frequent flights
on popular routes in order to meet the increased competition.8
The pro-regulation forces also contend that the airlines are already
highly competitive in service and pricing. More competition will
reduce the number of passengers per flight and services will be
wastefully duplicated." Small-city service will suffer if airlines can
freely drop unprofitable routes. Thousands of airline employees
will lose their job security because new airlines will come on the
scene free from the constraints of present collective bargaining
agreements." Finally, there is a fear that due to the uncertain
financial situation of the airlines caused by less regulation, they
will be unable to make commitments for support of airport revenue
bonds.'
These fears were acknowledged by former Chairman Kahn, but
he openly challenged their validity. As to the fear that deregulation
will lead to destructive competition, wasteful entry and cutthroat
18 Brenner, supra note 51, at 812.
" TIME, Aug. 14, 1978, at 53; WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1977, at 7, col. 1, a
Continental official was quoted as saying: "Pretty soon we won't be charging for
airline tickets-we'll just take up a collection and people can contribute what
they want."
8"U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, May 9, 1977, at 76, quoting Frank Borman:
"But in the final analysis, the safety of the air-transportation system is dependent
upon the integrity of the airlines' management. If you had a proliferation of
one-lung, gypsy operations, together with only two or three major airlines, you
would degrade safety."




85 Id. at 181.
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pricing, the former Chairman said gradual relaxation of regulations
will avoid these results. He advocated giving the airlines time to
adjust. He emphasized, however, that airlines must understand
that these changes are going to take place and that they must re-
orient themselves in order to survive."
Kahn also rejects the idea that airlines will crazily rush into
markets without regard to how many carriers they can sustain
and to how many others may be entering at the same time. He
predicts that entry will be cautious and that carriers will be care-
ful in selecting what markets to enter."'
As to the fear of cutthroat pricing, Kahn sees no real threat.
He predicts that carriers with a small share of one market, who
have most to gain from cutting their prices, will be deterred from
all-out price wars because they realize that in other markets they
will be up against the same competitors under circumstances where
the situation may be reversed.'
In reference to the fuel waste argument, Kahn argues that price
competition will in fact lead to more efficient use of fuel. His ra-
tionale for this is as follows: CAB receptivity to applications for
route authority accompanied by low-price options will provide a
wide range of choice for passengers, which will naturally tend to
put limits on cost-inflating competition in services (frills such as
stereo, movies, gourmet meals, etc.). People will get only those
services they are willing to pay for. Once price competition is
possible, lower fares will reduce the average net revenue yields
per passenger. Therefore, airlines will have to attract more passen-
gers on each flight (raise the break-even load factor) in order to be
profitable. If airlines act rationally, they will acquire equipment
and make scheduling decisions with a view toward maintaining
higher load factors. These load factors in turn will lead to more
efficient use of fuel as fewer and fuller airplanes will be flown."
IV. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS To DEREGULATE
The significant changes which have taken place in the past year,
principally in the form of heavy price competition, testify to the
88Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 20, 1978, at 39.
87 Id.
881d. at 41.
19 Id. at 41-42.
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CAB's enormous power to effect change. Much of that power
stems from the vagueness and broadness of its enabling statute. 0
Those who favor continued regulation point to the recent dis-
count fares and rule changes as support for the idea that there is
no need for a change in the law. Proponents of congressional
deregulation point out that without a statutory change, a later
Board with a more conservative membership and chairman could
very easily reverse the trend set by the current CAB. '
Although Chairman Kahn's efforts in the last year have served
to focus a great deal of public attention on the activities of the
Board and on the entire issue of deregulation, Congress has been
working on legislation in this area for the past four years.9" The
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, headed by Senator Edward Kennedy, began an investi-
gation of CAB practices in late 1974."' The resulting report came
to the conclusion that regulation of the airline industry should
be ended." The findings of the committee were that the airlines are
naturally competitive and that regulation has served only to raise
fares, promote inefficiency and discourage innovative new people
from entering the market."'
The Aviation Act of 1975" was introduced to the Senate in
October 1975. The main provisions of the bill called for time
limits on consideration of route cases," liberalized entry require-
ments"8 and price flexibility." The CAB was required to eliminate
all route restrictions by 1981. The bill also allowed trunk carriers
to expand into new markets without CAB restraint. Approval of
90 See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
O'H.R. RES'. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
'2 See note 93 and accompanying text, infra.
9BARRON'S, May 16, 1977, at 9.
"Kennedy, supra note 36, at 631.
9Id.
s'S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
97 Miller, Effects of the Administration's Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 on
Air Carrier Finances, TRANSP. J., Spring 1976, at 14. The time limit provision
was in response to the long delays which were noted earlier. See note 55 and ac-
companying text supra.
98 Miller, supra note 97. In reference to entry requirements, the Board was
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fare decreases would depend on degree of competition on the route,
average length of the haul and carrier aggressiveness."
In April of 1976, Senator Howard Cannon of the Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee launched his own hearings
on deregulation, and in 1976 Senators Kennedy and Cannon in-
troduced their own reform measures."' They introduced a new
bill in February of 1977 which developed into the Cannon-
Kennedy-Pearson Air Transportation Reform Act of 1978,"*4 which
was passed by the Senate on April 19, 1978. The House bill was
entitled the Air Service Improvement Act of 1978."' After con-
siderable discussion between House and Senate conferees the final
legislation, called the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (herein-
after referred to as the Deregulation Act),"' was signed by the
President on October 24, 1978." This Act makes significant
changes in the areas of fare, route and exit/entry regulation.
Section three of the new Deregulation Act makes profound
changes in the declaration of policy as set forth in section 1302 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.*6 While the original statute di-
rected the Board to consider competition only "to the extent neces-
sary" to develop an air transportation system,"0 ' the new law
encourages competition rather than merely tolerating it when
"necessary." The new declaration of policy directs the Board to
consider as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity:
(4) The placement of maximum reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition (A) to provide the
needed air transportation system, and (B) to encourage efficient
and well-managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to attract
capital....
10DId.
101 Kennedy introduced S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Cannon intro-
duced S. 3536 and S. 3709, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
"02S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S5900 (daily ed. April 19,
1978).
"'H.R. 12611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
1"Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (to be codified at scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.).
105 92 Stat. 1754.
"See notes 18-23 and accompanying text, supra.
10749 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1976).
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(7) The prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompeti-
tive practices in air transportation, and the avoidance of-(A)
unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market domination,
and monopoly power; and (B) other conditions; that would tend
to allow one or more air carriers unreasonably to increase prices,
reduce services, or exclude competition in air transportation ...
(9) The encouragement, development, and maintenance of an air
transportation system relying on actual and potential competition
to provide efficiency, innovation, and low prices, and to determine
the variety, quality, and price of air transportation services."0 8
The new declaration of policy is a combination of the Senate
and House bills, with a few omissions."° Other provisions direct
the CAB to maintain safety as its highest priority and to prevent
any deterioration in safety procedures. The Board is to encourage
fair wages and equitable working conditions in the air transport
industry... and to develop a regulatory environment where decisions
are reached promptly."2 The declaration of policy states that the
encouragement of air service at major urban areas through secon-
dary or satellite airports is in the public interest.1 8 It directs the
'10 Pub. L. No. 95-504, S 3(a), 92 Stat. 1706-7 (1978), amending 49 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a) (1976).
101 H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978). Two omissions were
made from the Senate and House versions. These were paragraph 2 from the
Senate bill and paragraph 3 from the House bill. Paragraph 2 read as follows:
(2) The development and maintenance of an efficient and reliable
air transportation system which provides an opportunity for efficient
and well-managed air carriers to earn a fair and reasonable re-
turn on investment in a competitive environment in order to meet
the present and future needs of the public, the foreign and do-
mestic commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, Lnd the
national defense. S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978).
Paragraph 3 from the House bill read as follows:
(3) The encouragement and development of an air transportation
system which is responsive to the needs of the public and is adapted
to the present and future needs of (A) the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, (B) the Postal Service, and (C)
the national defense, and which includes, where feasible, the author-
ity for air carriers to serve unused routes authorized to be served
by other air carriers. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38
(1978).
110Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1706 (1978) (to be codified as 49
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2)).
"IId. at 92 Stat. 1706 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3)).
112 Id. at 92 Stat. 1706 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. S 1302(a)(5)).
"'
3 Id. at 92 Stat. 1706 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6)).
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CAB to encourage the maintenance of "a comprehensive and con-
venient system of continuous scheduled airline service for small
communities and for isolated areas, with direct Federal assistance
where appropriate."' ...
A radical change in orientation is prescribed for the CAB by
virtue of the new declaration of policy."' The comprehensive
amendments to the 1958 Act reflect a change in the attitude of
the legislature toward the industry as a whole. One member of
Congress expressed the reason for the attitude change in this way:
"Historically, aviation was a fledgling industry which needed help
and financial guarantees, and the public needed controls for safety.
But we're 40 years from that point and there is no need for the
CAB to be overly protective of a $100 billion industry. 1.. This
statement condenses a major argument of the proponents of de-
regulation. The new Deregulation Act recognizes the goal of pro-
moting competition throughout its amendments of the 1958 Act
but nowhere is it more explicit than in the new declaration of
policy.
The subsection in the declaration of policy concerning service
to small communities represents an appeasement of many Senators
and Representatives from sparsely populated states who expressed
the fear that many of the towns in their home states would lose
air service completely when exit restrictions are relaxed allowing
carriers to drop unprofitable routes."1 In addition to the provision
in the policy declaration, the Deregulation Act adds a new section
to the Act entitled "Small Community Air Service.' 1. It guarantees
continued air transportation for ten years to all cities listed on air
carrier certificates on the date of enactment, including cities to
which service has been suspended. The Board is directed to estab-
114 Id. at 92 Stat. 1706 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8)).
115 The amendments to § 1302 also add provisions concerning foreign air
transportation which are identical to the old declaration of policy in § 1302 for
domestic air transportation. 92 Stat. 1707 (1978). As this comment is concerned
with domestic air transport, these changes are beyond the scope of the discussion
here.
11I Cohen, Regulatory Report/CAB's New Chairman Charts an Independent
Course, 7 NAT'L J. 1559, 1566 (1975), quoting Rep. Norman Y. Mineta.
117 124 CONG. REc. S5863, (daily ed. April 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Mc-
Govern).
"I Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 33, 92 Stat. 1732 (1978) (to be codified as 49 U.S.C.
§ 1389).
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lish a level of "essential air transportation," which cannot be less
than two daily round trips, five days a week, or the level of service
actually provided during 1977."19
Air carriers serving cities which are guaranteed service must give
notice before reducing service below the level of essential air
transportation."' If within the ten-year period, the Board receives
notice of a reduction in service, it must make every effort to arrange
for another carrier to provide essential service. If unable to arrange
such service within the notice period it must require the carrier
to continue service for additional thirty-day periods until a re-
placement is found."' Of course, the carrier receives subsidies
during its time of extended service. After January 1, 1983, any
carrier may file an application seeking to replace a subsidized
carrier. The Board must grant the application if the applicant
shows that it can provide a substantial improvement in the air
service and a decrease in the amount of compensation."'
The guaranteed essential service to small communities ties in
with changes in exit regulation. In theory, the Deregulation Act
significantly changes prior law in regard to exit regulation. The old
Act stated that:
No air carrier shall abandon any route, or part thereof, for which
a certificate has been issued by the Board, unless, upon the appli-
cation of such air carrier, after notice and hearing, the Board shall
find such abandonment to be in the public interest. Any interested
person may file with the Board a protest or memorandum of oppo-
sition to or in support of any such abandonment. '
The new Act repeals the above provision and provides that gener-
"I Id. at 92 Stat. 1739 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1371). Air transporta-
tion in Alaska is to remain at a level no lower than that which existed during
1976, or two round trips per week, whichever is greater. This is subject to con-
trary agreements between the Board and the state agency in Alaska, after con-
sultation with the community affected. Id.
I" Id. at 92 Stat. 1733-34 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. 5 1371). Certified carri-
ers and subsidized carriers must give at least 90 days notice and unsubsidized
commuters must give 30 days notice. Id.
111 Id. at 92 Stat. 1734. The Board also is directed to review all cities which
have been deleted from air carrier certificates since 1968, and decide whether
any of these cities should be made eligible for the new subsidy program. Com-
munities added by this procedure also are protected by the notice provisions de-
scribed at note 118 supra. Id. at 92 Stat. 1736.
"IId. at 92 Stat. 1738 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1371).
1-49 U.S.C. § 1371(j) (1976).
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ally there are no exit restrictions. The exception to this is where
essential air transportation is in jeopardy.'5 In addition, a certifi-
cated air carrier must give sixty days notice before terminating or
suspending non-stop or single-plane air transportation between two
points being provided by such air carrier under its certificate."' It
is the routes to small communities, previously supported by cross-
subsidization, from which carriers will most likely want to exit.
Yet the legislative history of the Deregulation Act states that car-
riers will be forced to continue serving these unprofitable routes
until the Board certifies that another air carrier is willing and able
to step in and provide essential air transportation.' Thus, in es-
sence, meaningful exit freedom has been delayed indefinitely.
The Deregulation Act drastically changes the regulation of fares
by the CAB. The Board is prohibited from determining whether
the fares charged for interstate transportation are unjustly or un-
reasonably high unless, after July 1, 1979, the fare is over five
percent higher than the standard industry fare level for the same
service." ' This prohibition will not apply to any market where the
affected carrier transports seventy percent or more of the pas-
senger air traffic. On the other hand, the Board cannot find a fare
for scheduled passenger transportation to be unjustly or unreason-
ably low unless it is more than fifty percent below the standard
industry fare level or it is found to be predatory.' Air carriers also
are allowed to add new classes of services to provide more variety
to consumers. The Board also can increase the permissible per-
centage under the standard level by which rates can be lowered.
The Deregulation Act also provides that parties opposing any fare
on the basis that it is too low have the burden of proving that the
fare is indeed too low.
" See notes 116-20 and accompanying text supra.
"Pub. L. No. 95-504, S 19, 92 Stat. 1720-21 (1978) (to be codified as 49
U.S.C. § 1371).
IN H. CONF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5523, 5547.
127ld. at § 37, 92 Stat. 1741 (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. S 1371). "Standard
industry fare level" is defined as the fare level in effect on July 1, 1977, but is
to be adjusted no less than semi-annually on the basis of actual operating costs
per available seat-mile. Id. at 92 Stat. 1741-42.
2'id. at 92 Stat. 1741.
129 Id.
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The general area of entry regulation is now covered in new
provisions regarding the granting of certificates and in the new
automatic entry program. The old Act directed the Board to issue
a certificate if it found the applicant to be fit, willing and able to
perform the air transportation properly and that the transportation
was "required by the public convenience and necessity. .. .
The new Deregulation Act provides for a different standard to be
applied in hearings on the issuance of certificates. It retains the
requirement that the Board find the applicant to be fit, willing and
able to perform, but the transportation need not be "required by,"
but rather only "consistent with" the public convenience and
necessity."' The new Act goes on to define the burdens of proof
placed on the parties. The applicant has the burden of showing
that it is fit, willing and able. As to determinations of consistency
with public convenience, however, "an opponent of the application
shall have the burden of showing that such air transportation is
not consistent with the public convenience and necessity."'" In
addition, the transportation applied for shall be deemed to be
consistent with the public convenience and necessity "unless the
Board finds based upon a preponderance of the evidence that such
transportation is not [so] consistent.""' These provisions shift the
focus of certification procedures so that the Board is practically
forced to issue the certificate in almost all situations, unless the
carrier is clearly unfit or unable to provide the service. '
The pressure to certify new carriers created by the new Act
will result, according to some sources, in a rush by inexperienced
operators to form airlines. This theory ignores the economic reali-
ties of the situation, however. Starting an airline is an expensive
proposition and realistically speaking, few lenders would invest
millions in a project if they were not confident in the operators'
12049 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(1) (1976).
131 Pub. L. No. 95-504, S 8, 92 Stat. 1712 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
S 1371(d)(1)).
131Id. at S 14, 92 Stat. 1719.
1"3 Id.
"4This interpretation apparently has been adopted by the CAB, which re-
cently stated: "In summary, we have found that the new Act essentially creates
a rebuttable presumption in favor of granting all applications for interstate and
overseas certificate authority. This presumption is not overcome unless the record
contains an affirmative showing that the public interest requires a different result."
CAB Order No. 78-12-105, at 3 (Dec. 14, 1978).
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ability to run the airline." The key point is that carriers must
still be fit, willing and able to perform the transportation. The
Federal Aviation Administration will control safety standards as
before. It is unlikely that safety will be threatened in any way by
the advent of deregulation.
The "Automatic Entry Program" provides for relaxed entry into
scheduled non-stop transportation.'" Interstate air carriers and cer-
tain intrastate air carriers which meet specific qualifications3' can,
in 1979, 1980 and 1981, select one pair of points between which
it will provide scheduled non-stop service, in addition to the points
it is presently authorized to serve. Selections are filed with the
Board, which will only disapprove a route if it finds that the car-
rier is not fit, willing and able to provide the service selected. Air
carriers also can designate one route each year, for which they
already provide regularly scheduled non-stop service, which will
not be open to automatic entry."' This protection is only from
entry provided for in this automatic entry section, however. Other-
wise, carriers can apply freely for new routes.
The Board is required to publish lists of the segments selected
for automatic entry. Duplicative selections can be changed, but
more than one new entry on the same route will be certified if
that is what is requested." The Board also can modify the entry
program on an emergency basis if it finds the program is causing
substantial public harm to the national air transportation system
or a substantial reduction in air service to small and medium sized
communities.' ° Not later than December 31, 1980, the Board is
to have completed a study of the entry program. It is to evaluate
whether the program is consistent with the new declaration of
"'5 Kelleher, supra note 34, at 286.
"Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 12, 92 Stat. 1716 (1978).
37 Interstate air carriers must have a certificate of public convenience and
necessity which has been in force during the entire preceding calendar year and
must have provided air transportation of persons during such calendar year. In-
trastate air carriers must have a valid certificate or license issued by a state regu-
latory authority and must have operated more than one hundred million available
seat-miles in intrastate air transportation in the preceding calendar year. Id. at
92 Stat. 1717.
1381d. at 92 Stat. 1717-18.
139 Id. at 92 Stat. 1718.
14o ld.
COMMENTS
policy in the Act and to evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
cedure."I
The provisions for evaluation and modification of the entry pro-
gram demonstrate the efforts by Congress to make regulatory
reform as gradual as possible. This plan, hopefully, will minimize
any dislocations. The opponents of reform predict disaster, as usual,
but even they should be heartened by these efforts at ongoing
evaluation during the institution of reforms. Those who advocated
more rapid changes may be impatient, but as deregulation is an
unknown quantity, it will probably be better in the long run to
go about it slowly and carefully.1"
Section sixteen of the Deregulation Act provides for the re-
moval of so-called "closed-door restrictions." These are the condi-
tions attached to certificates that prohibit interstate and overseas
carriers from providing local passenger service between any of the
points on its certificate.1"
Entry is also liberalized into markets where authority to fly
has not been used to its full potential. If a carrier is authorized
to provide round trip service in the continental United States and
fails to provide a minimum of five round trips per week for
thirteen out of any twenty-six-week period, the Board is to issue a
certificate to the first applicant who is qualified under the Act.'"
Where more than one carrier has been serving the route the Board
has sixty days to decide on the new application, as opposed to a
fifteen-day deadline where only one carrier has been providing serv-
ice." These provisions also apply to seasonal routes, with the re-
quirement that the service be provided half the weeks of the season
in order to avoid the certification of a new carrier onto the route.'
In addition to the changes in fare and entry/exit regulation,
the Deregulation Act also adds a new title to the Act called the
"Sunset Provisions. 1 . These new provisions initially provide for
141 Id.
"uWilson, Deregulation: How Far Should It Go?, 51 IND. L.J. 700, 714
(1976); Av. WEEK & SPACE TEcH., Mar. 6, 1978, at 37, paraphrasing former
Chairman Kahn.
143Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 16, 92 Stat. 1719 (1978).
'"Id. at 5 10, 92 Stat. 1713.
4Id. at 92 Stat. 1714-15.
"'Id. at 92 Stat. 1714.
"Id. at § 40, 92 Stat. 1744.
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termination of Board authority with respect to specific provisions
of the Act on December 31, 1981. These provisions include the
Board's authority to issue certificates on the basis of consistency
with public convenience or necessity for interstate, overseas and
foreign air transportation. Also, carriers with the above types of
certificates will then be allowed to engage in charter transportation.
All exit restrictions are dropped except those with respect to
essential air transportation. Virtually all the Board's rate-making
authority ceases on January 1, 1983.14'
Certain elements of the Board's authority is to be carried on
by other Federal departments beginning January 1, 1985. The
Department of Transportation will handle foreign transportation
(in consultation with the Department of State) and compensation
for providing essential air transportation. Jurisdiction over con-
solidations, mergers and co-operative working arrangements will
be vested in the Department of Justice and authority to set mail
rates will be transferred to the Postal Service."9
These new provisions also call for the Board to prepare and
submit to Congress by January 1, 1984, a comprehensive review
of its implementation of the regulatory reform measures in the
Deregulation Act.9  Among the listed tasks to be included in the
review are comparisons of the following factors between 1977 and
1983: the degree of competition in the industry; the extent of route
authority granted which has not been utilized by the carrier in-
volved; the extent of air transportation service provided to small
communities, together with details on comparative subsidy costs.
The Board is also to assess the impact of the reforms upon the na-
tional air transportation system and to opine as to whether the
changes have improved or harmed the domestic air transportation
system.1"' These evaluations are to be accompanied by an opinion
as to whether the public interest requires continuation of the Board
and its functions beyond January 1, 1985. If the Board concludes
that it should continue to exist, it is to provide detailed recom-
mendations as to how provisions of the Deregulation Act are to be
revised to ensure continued improvement of the national air trans-
'Id. at 92 Stat. 1744-45.
I ld. at 92 Stat. 1745.
1 0 9Sd.
15,1 Id. at 92 $tat. 1746.
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portation system."' Other provisions of the Deregulation Act in-
clude an employee protection program,"' a framework for expe-
dited procedures,' amendments to the loan guarantee program,"'
and a section on experimental certificates."'
V. CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of the Act is obviously deregulation. Some
parts of the Act, however, do little to attain that end. The worst
example of this is the ten-year guarantee of essential air service,
which effectively continues a policy of exit regulation. In other
respects, the bill is quite strong. These include the significant
5' Id. The adopted provisions take effect less rapidly than the original pro-
posal in the House bill which provided for a termination of CAB authority on
December 31, 1982. H.R. 12611, H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66
(1978).
" Pub. L. No. 95-504, S 43, 92 Stat. 1750 (1978). This plan provides monthly
assistance payments and preferred hiring policies for persons previously employed
for at least four years by an air carrier who have been deprived of employment
or adversely affected with respect to his/her compensation by a bankruptcy or
major contraction of a certificated interstate air carrier during the first ten years
after enactment of the bill. The Board must determine that the regulatory re-
forms were the major cause of the bankruptcy or contraction. A "major con-
traction" is a reduction by at least seven and one-half per cent of the total num-
ber of full time employees within a twelve-month period.
'mid. at 5 7, 92 Stat. 1711-12. This section requires the Board to (1) schedule
any certificate or route application for public hearing; (2) begin to make a deter-
mination with respect to simplified procedures; or (3) dismiss the application on
the merits within ninety days after it is filed with the Board.
The "simplified procedures" are not set out in the bill, but rather are to be
promulgated in rules issued by the Board. Such rules are to provide for adequate
notice and submission of appropriate written evidence and argument by the appli-
cants, but need not require oral evidence or hearings before the Board. Id. at
21, 92 Stat. 1723.
As to matters concerning mergers and mutual aid agreements, if the Board
orders an evidentiary hearing, it must issue a final order or decision within twelve
months. If no such hearing is ordered a decision must be made within six months.
Id. at § 38, 92 Stat. 1743.
"'5Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 42, 92 Stat. 1748-50 (1978). The loan guarantee
program is extended for five years. Eligibility is given to commuter carriers and
intrastate carriers. Charters are eligible for the purchase of all nonconvertible
cargo aircraft. The total amount of loans which may be guaranteed under the
program is extended to $100,000,000. The amount of loans to be extended to
charters depends on the amount of service they provide to small communities.
I Id. at § 13, 92 Stat. 1718-19. The Board can grant route authority for only
a temporary period whenever it decides a test period is desirable to determine if
projected services, fares, and charges will in fact materialize. It also can use this
method to assess the impact of the new authority on the national air transport
system.
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changes in the declaration of policy and new standards for con-
sidering a carrier for certification. The provisions for fare deregula-
tion still leave some control with the CAB, at least until 1983.
This bill, like all highly controversial legislation, is necessarily
a product of compromise. This is reflected in the continuation of
some aspects of regulation even after (and if) the CAB is dis-
mantled. The conservative and gradual approach taken by the
Congress in the Deregulation Act would be a good example for
future deregulation bills to follow. A step-by-step approach is the
only reasonable way to go about making profound changes in the
economic structure of major industries. The only question to be
answered as to each industry is how gradual the changes must be
to obtain optimal results. Hopefully, observance and evaluation of
this effort will be helpful in drafting future legislation.
Deregulation of the airline industry is a highly complex and
controversial issue. Long-awaited regulatory reform legislation has
finally been enacted. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 calls
for drastic changes in fare and exit/entry regulation. It even calls
for much of the authority of the CAB to be transferred to other
agencies or done away with altogether. Despite the many predic-
tions of disaster, the reality is that the airlines are faced with a
new environment in which to do business.
The frank admission by former Chairman Kahn before the pas-
sage of the Deregulation Act that the old statute would have to be
violated in order to achieve his goals creates a fertile source of
controversy in the whole area of administrative law. It must be
asked if the favorable response to Kahn's efforts from Congress
would be duplicated if other agencies decided to go beyond their
enabling statutes in the interests of lessening regulation wherever
they saw fit. A valid question might be whether an agency must
wait until deregulation or regulatory reforms has been proposed
in Congress before it can begin deregulating on its own.
On a practical level, perhaps the most forceful check on agencies'
violating their own statutes as the CAB did is the fact that most
agency heads do not want to eliminate their own jobs, as Kahn
professed a wish to do. There remains the prospect, however, that
the agencies will violate their statutes in order to achieve goals
other than deregulation. For example, they might attempt to take
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over matters which are not within their grant of jurisdiction. The
victims of such overstepping might resort to the courts or to Con-
gress. In any case, Kahn has assuredly opened up a vast area of
controversy with great potential for drastic effects on the whole
philosophy of administrative procedure.
What will be the ultimate results of these changes cannot be
predicted with any certainty, though as we have seen, parties on
each side of the issue have painted very dissimilar pictures of the
future under deregulation. One thing is certain: this legislation
is different from the great majority of the laws passed in Congress
in that it seeks to reduce governmental interference in private
business rather than to increase it." ' The success or failure of these
measures in improving air transportation will certainly serve as an
indicator of what happens when government backs away and lets
private enterprise take its course. If the measures meet with suc-
cess, Congress may be faced with demands for less government
regulation in other areas. Whatever the results, an important step
has been taken and at least as far as the air transportation industry
is concerned, things will never be the same.
151 Opponents of the bills argued that this would result in more rather than less
regulation. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1978), views of Bob
Stump; Frank Borman in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 9, 1977 at 75-76.
They also point to different treatment of various types of carriers under the new
legislation. There is still no doubt that the intent behind the changes, however, is
to reduce regulation. This intent became a bit confused in the drafting of the
Senate bill. Although not adopted in the final legislation, it was proposed that the
Board be given authority to issue certificates to local air transportation carriers.
The Senate report did not address the issue of why the bill extended regulation
here rather than contracted it. While the report states that the amendment aimed
to keep these lines operating in an essentially unregulated environment, it goes
on to put burdens of obtaining certificates of public convenience, as well as limiting
exit options, upon commuter carriers. The only comment addressed to why the
Senate did this stated: "It is clear that the commuter airline industry, small
though it is, has proved in the market place that it is indeed worthy of full par-
ticipation in the Nation's air transportation system." This apparently referred to
the ability to challenge trunkline carriers for subsidies and eventually, through
automatic entry programs, for various routes as well. S.2493, S. REP. No. 631,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-94 (1978).
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